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It thus seems that the holding of the Colorado Supreme Court
in the Smith Brothers case was unfortunate because price fixing
is clearly a quasi legislative function 18 and, as such, no notice and
opportunity to be heard are necessary.
As the United States Supreme Court said in Bi-Metallic Co.
v. Colorado :19
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few
people it is impracticable that every one should have a
direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not
require all public acts to be done in town meeting or on
assembly of the whole .... There must be a limit to indi-
vidual argument in such matters if government is to go on.
USE OF EVIDENCE IN HEARINGS BEFORE
COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
AL COOTER and ROBERT KELLEY *
It is hardly necessary to call attention to the confusion which
exists with regard to the application of technical rules of evidence
to hearings had before the myriad administrative bodies which
have been created in Colorado. In proceedings before the various
boards, commissions, and agencies there is no homogeneous or
even similar procedure to be followed with regard to the exclusion-
ary rules of evidence. Some of the larger and better known agen-
cies, such as the Public Utilities Commission and the Industrial
Commission, are governed by rather comprehensive statutory re-
quirements which have become well defined by subsequent rules
adopted by these commissions themselves as well as by custom
and prior experience.
Because the list of administrative agencies is continually
growing, the frequency of litigation before these bodies is in-
creasing at a corresponding rate. Adding to that fact the common
knowledge that our society is becoming more and more complex,
the resulting inference is that litigants seeking redress will con-
tinue to grow in number, thus presenting an opportunity and a
duty on the part of the bar to provide adequate representation.
In many cases, the individual who has a grievance or who
has been called before one of the agencies for a violation of some
activity within its control will feel that he does not need an attor-
,3 "Rate making, of course, is a legislative process," Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 211 U. S. 210, 226; "In the fixing of rates--a legislative act-the legisla-
ture has a broad discretion which it may exercise directly or through a legisla-
tive agency in accordance with standards prescribed by the legislature," St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38; "Process in the form of a notice
to a corporation to be affected by a contemplated or intended order (as to rate
making) of the commission . . . is neither contemplated nor provided for, ...
nor is essential to the validity thereof," Randall Gas Co. v. Star Glass Co., 88
S. E. 840, 78 W. Va. 252.
"239 U. S. 441.
* Students, University of Denver College of Law.
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ney to represent him because the proceeding is not in a court of
law. For various reasons, this assumption may be correct in a
number of instances. On the other hand, adopting such a premise
may be incorrect, for a hearing before an administrative agency
is quasi judicial in nature, and in some of the larger agencies it
is difficult to discern any difference between the hearing conducted
by them and those instituted before a court of law. Such agencies
as the Industrial Commission and the Public Utilities Commission
conduct their hearings in a room very similar to a court room, the
referee or trial examiner is an attorney, and usually the parties
are represented by attorneys. In view of these facts, it is under-
standable that hearings of this nature are conducted in much the
same manner as any judicial trial.
In order not to distort the picture and because it is not feasible
for the purposes of this article to present a complete summary of
the similarities and dissimilarities of administrative tribunals as
compared to those of the judiciary, it is thought desirable by
these writers to indulge in a few generalities. Many of the more
than one hundred administrative bodies in Colorado are small in
size and in the scope of their functions, and frequently they are
staffed by only two or three persons. Necessarily, the manner in
which their hearings are conducted may not be analogous to that
of the larger agencies aforementioned. Oftentimes the "courtroom"
of such an agency is composed of a desk and a chair; the hearing
is conducted by a layman, albeit an expert in his administrative
field; and the party litigant is not represented by qualified counsel.
In such a proceeding there is no semblance of a judicial trial. It
does not follow, however, that a party before such an unimpressive
board hearing does not require the services of counsel. He can
as easily be deprived of his liberty or property without due process
of law in such nondescript settings as he can before one of the
more impressive, judicial type agencies; perhaps more so.
It is the underlying theory of administrative law that the
hearings are to be conducted informally, on a non-technical, flexi-
ble basis.' As a general rule, administrative agencies conducting
hearings are not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence
which are employed in jury trials.2 Whether or not a trial exami-
ner will admit or deny the introduction of certain types of evidence
will depend upon the attorney's ability to persuade him that the
rule in Colorado calls for its admission or exclusion. The trick is
to find the rule.
It may be fairly asked, "What, then, is the status of Colorado
law on this aspect of administrative law?"
When an attorney in Colorado is first confronted with a hear-
ing before one of our administrative bodies, he will likely find it
difficult to ascertain with any certainty the existing and control-
ling law with reference to the presentation of evidence by both
Robert H. Jackson, The Administrative Process, 5 Journal of Social Philos-
ophy 143 (1940).
2 Carrol v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507.
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sides. In his preparation for the hearing, he will find five possible
sources available: (1) 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated; (2)
Agency-Made Rules of Procedure; (3) Colorado Supreme Court
Decisions; (4) Decisions of Federal Courts and Courts of the
Several States; and (5) the U. S. and Colorado Constitutions.
Each of these sources will be discussed herein.
1935 COLORADO STATUTES ANNOTATED
Using the statutory authority as a starting point, it must be
called to the reader's attention that there is no convenient way
in which to locate agency restrictions or requirements as to evi-
dence. There is no such title as Administrative Law in the stat-
utes.3 Moreover, it is difficult to define the term so that the agen-
cies can be located with any ease or accuracy. Of course, the prob-
lem at hand will indicate the subject title to look for in the index.
This fact, however, will most likely be of small value for in very
few of the sections creating agencies is the subject of evidence
mentioned. For example, Ch. 19, "Barbers," Sec. 12, provides that
the Board of Examiners:
* * * shall have power to revoke any certificate of
registration granted by it .. . provided that before any
certificate shall be revoked the holder thereof shall have
notice . . .and . . .be given a public hearing before said
board, and full opportunity to produce testimony in his or
her behalf, and to confront the witnesses against him or
her.
Sec. 24 sets out the same thing in different words. There is noth-
ing in the statute above quoted that specifies the kind or quality
of evidence acceptable in the hearing, although these provisions do
satisfy some of the requirements of procedural due process of law.
As a sidelight, it might be conjectured that perhaps a trial
examiner could be persuaded to follow the statutory provisions
of another agency on the theory that such provisions should logi-
cally apply to all agencies because of their similarity of creation
and purpose. To illustrate, the Workmen's Compensation Act of
Colorado 4 provides for a hearing, for notice to be given each in-
terested party, that parties shall have a right to be present at
any hearing in person or by attorney or other agent, and that
they may present pertinent testimony and have the right to cross
examine. It is also provided that:
The Commission may receive as evidence and use as
proof of any fact in dispute the following matters, in addi-
3 There is a subject-head entitled, "Administrative Code," originally enacted
in 1933, subsequently repealed and a new act passed in 1941 replacing it. It
now appears as c. 3 (L. '41, p. 87, sec. 60). This act cannot in any sense of the
word be likened to an administrative procedure act since its scope is restricted
to organization and functions of governmental departments at the state level.
It denominates and describes the powers of the nine administrative departments,
attempting to classify subordinate sub-units, but achieves only partial success.
4 COLO. STAT. ANN., ch. 97, sec. 373 (1935).
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tion to sworn testimony presented at open hearings:
(1) Reports of attending or examining physicians.
(2) Reports of investigators appointed by the Com-
mission.
(3) Reports of employers, including copies of time
sheets, book accounts or other records.
(4) Hospital records in the case of an injured or
deceased employee.
Provided, however, that the Commission may cause
an examination to be made of the person of the injured
employee, or without notice take testimony or inspect the
time books, payrolls or other records of the employer. All
ex parte evidence received by the Commission shall be
reduced to writing and any party in interest shall have
the opportunity to examine and rebut the same by cross
examination or by further evidence.
It is to be noted that the above section is statutory authority
for the admission of hearsay evidence in compensation cases. A
careful search of the statutes failed to reveal any rule about the
exclusion of hearsay or the abolition of the hearsay rule which
was any more enlightening than the Workmen's Compensation Act
above quoted. Accordingly, the Colorado statutes shed very little
light on the question.
AGENCY-MADE RULES OF PROCEDURE
Turning next to the rules promulgated by each agency, it will
be discovered that the problem of evidence has been given some
treatment. The rules of some of the agencies are set out in pam-
phlet form 5 and are primarily designed to prescribe the methods
employed in the administration of that particular act. For ex-
ample, the pamphlet prepared by the Public Utilities Commission,
one of the best organized agencies in Colorado, contains the fol-
lowing provision :6
Rule 12-Hearings. (j) Rules of Evidence.
In conducting any investigation, inquiry or hearing,
neither the Commission nor any officer or employee there-
of shall be bound by the technical rules of evidence, and
no informality in any proceeding or in the manner of
taking testimony shall invalidate any order, decision, rule
or regulation made, approved or confirmed by the Com-
'Sec. 2 of the Industrial Commission Law, C. 97, COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935),
provides: It shall be the duty of the Commission, and it shall have the power,
jktrisdiction and authority... to adopt reasonable and proper rules and regula-
tions relative to the exercise of its powers and authority and proper rules to
govern its proceedings and to regulate the mode and manner of investigations
and hearings .... It shall also cause to be printed in proper form for distribu-
tion to the public proper pamphlets showing its orders, regulations and rules
of procedure and shall furnish the same to any person upon application there-
fore.
. Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Public Utilities Commission
of thc State of Colorado, effective January 1, 1951. (Decision No. 35628.)
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mission. Rules of evidence before Courts of Record of
the State of Colorado will be generally followed but may
be relaxed in the discretion of the Commission or hearing
officer when deviation from technical rules of evidence
will aid in ascertaining the facts. When objection is made
to the admissibility of evidence, such evidence may be
received subject to later ruling by the Commission. The
Commission, or hearing officer, in its discretion, either
with or without objection may exclude inadmissible evi-
dence or order cumulative or irrelevant evidence discon-
tinued. Parties objecting to the introduction of evidence
shall briefly state the grounds of objection at the time
such evidence is offered. The evidence to be admitted at
hearings shall be material and relevant to the issue.
Certain other of the larger agencies also have available in
pamphlet or mimeographed form, working rules of procedure.
However, the preponderance of smaller administrative bodies have
no such rules in printed form available.
COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Undoubtedly, the best source of law governing the reception
of evidence in an administrative hearing will be the decisions of
the Colorado Supreme Court. Although there are many such de-
cisions wherein the hearing by the Industrial Commission or the
Public Utilities Commission has been reviewed, there are rela-
tively few Colorado cases dealing with the holding of other admin-
istrative bodies. Because of this fact, the case law of evidence
is most easily found in the Colorado Digest under the headings of
"Workmen's Compensation," "Public Utilities Commission," etc.
Due to the relative newness of the field of administrative law.
there is no such title as this in the body of the 1937 edition of
the Colorado Digest; however, it does appear in the Cumulative
Supplement to Volume 2. Unfortunately under this title in the
aforementioned 1952 Supplement there are to be found only a few
scattered cases and none under the sub section of "Evidence."
Consequently, it is best to search the sections under specific titles
as suggested above.
The body of administrative case law in Colorado covers such
matters of evidence as hearsay, expert opinion, burden of proof,
competency, weight and credibility and other related matters. Its
decisions pertaining to evidence admissible in an administrative
hearing are not at all uniform. In most cases, for example, the
Supreme Court of Colorado has upheld the exclusion of hearsay,7
but in other cases it has permitted its admission.8 In the case of
Olson-Hall v. Industrial Commission, the refusal of the Commis-
sion to admit in evidence a wholly unidentified statement of the
employer respecting a claim of the employee Olson as to the acci-
Olson-Hall v. Industrial Commission, 71 Colo. 228, 205 P. 527 (1922).
Empire Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 94 Colo. 98, 28 P. 2d 337 (1933).
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dent and other hearsay evidence was assigned as error. The
court said:
These offers were properly excluded. It is true that
the Workmen's Compensation statutes of most of the
states provide that industrial commissions shall reach
their conclusions without regard to technical rules of
evidence. It is manifest, however, that the rule against
hearsay is not technical, but vitally substantial, and may
not properly be disregarded under such statutory provi-
sions without grave danger of collusion, imposition and
injustice. If a claimant be permitted to make out a case
upon the essential facts of accidental injury upon hearsay
testimony alone there is no limit to the frauds and wrongs
that may be encouraged and made possible. (Italics sup-
plied.)
At first blush, the above decision would seem to lay down the
rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible at all. On closer ex-
amination, however, the phrase "hearsay testimony alone" has
the effect of qualifying the rule to the extent of providing that
hearsay is admissible, but it must be fortified by a residuum of
legally sufficient evidence before it will support a finding. This
view is supported by the leading case of Carroll v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co.,9 wherein the court reviewed the sufficiency of hearsay
testimony to support a finding made by the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Commission. The statute in that case provided that the Com-
mission was not bound by the common law or statutory rules of
evidence. The finding of the Commission was based solely on the
testimony of witnesses who related what Carroll, the injured em-
ployee, told them relative to how he was injured. The court, in
reversing the finding of the Commission said:
The act may be taken to mean that while the Commis-
sion's inquiry is not limited by the common law or statu-
tory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of
evidence, . . . and it may, in its discretion, accept any
evidence that is offered, still in the end there must be a
residuum of legal evidence to support the claim before
an award can be made.
In a later Colorado case 10 the Supreme Court was confronted
with the same question as in the Knickerbocker Ice Co. case, i.e.,
whether there was any competent evidence to support the Indus-
trial Commission's finding that the deceased employee had been
injured in an accident arising out of or in the course of his em-
ployment. The Commission had admitted hearsay evidence in the
form of a written report of the accident by the employer and the
State Mine Inspector's report to the Commission, together with
evidence of the fact that the employer had notified the Commis-
sion that it had paid the funeral benefits. Contrary to the Olson-
Hall and Knickerbocker cases, the court affirmed the Commission's
9 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507.
"Empire Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra, n. 8.
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finding and said :11
That the company report, the conduct of the company,
and the report of the mine inspector, were proper evidence
in the hearing before the Commission seems clear. That
these supported a finding that the accident arose out of
and in the course of the employment, notwithstanding the
testimony of Medina (an eye witness) and that we are
without power to interfere therewith, are equally clear.
The language of the preceding decision raises the question of
what is necessary to constitute proper and sufficient evidence. Of
course, the appellate court can do no more than consider and
decide whether the decision of the agency is supported by suffi-
cient and proper evidence. The Colorado Supreme Court has uni-
formly held, "that findings of the Industrial Commission as to
facts must be accepted by the courts if there is any substantial
evidence to support them." 12 The court in American Mining Co.
v. Zupet,13 stated:
The matter of determining the probative effect of
evidence in such cases, where there is a conflict, still re-
mains exclusively with the Commission where there is
evidence for its consideration or from which it could
draw a reasonable inference.
As was stated in a New York Supreme Court decision, Stork Res-
taurant, Inc. v. Boland :
1 4
A finding is supported by the evidence only when the
evidence is so substantial that from it an inference of
the existence of the fact found may be drawn reasonably.
A mere scintilla of evidence sufficient to justify a sus-
picion is not sufficient to support a finding upon which
legal rights and obligations are based. That requires
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might ac-
cept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Our Colorado Supreme Court has used similar language in stat-
ing, "that expert medical testimony given in a hearing before the
Industrial Commission constitutes substantial, credible evidence." 15
Likewise, in C. S. Card Iron Works Co. v. Radovich,16 the court
held that opinion evidence of physicians is competent in Work-
men's Compensation cases.
However, the Supreme Court felt that expert medical testi-
mony in the case of U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial
Commission 17 was not competent evidence. Therein, three doctors
testified as to the cause of claimant's heart attack to the effect that:
The excitement may have been a precipitating factor.
Ibid.
2 Zuzich v. Leyden Lignite Co., 120 Colo. 21, 206 P. 2d 833.
13101 Colo. 283, 72 P. 2d 281.
14 282 N. Y. 256, 26 N. E. 2d 247 (1940).
SkJoldahl v. Industrial Commission, 108 Colo. 140, 113 P. 2d 871.
94 Colo. 426, 30 P. 2d 1108.
"122 Colo. 31, 219 P. 2d 315 (1950).
DICTA
Dec., 1952
* . . I don't know .... It is a possibility. I couldn't say
absolutely but I guess statistically probably more infrac-
tions occur when people are lying quietly in bed than when
they are exerting themselves but it is quite within the
realm of possibility. (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
The court said the findings in favor of the claimant were unwar-
ranted and could not be sustained. "A resort to mere conjecture
of possibilities will not take the place of direct or circumstantial
evidence. No number of mere possibilities will establish a prob-
ability."
Thus, as to the competency of expert opinion evidence, it is
apparent that it is admissible for what it is worth. Even though
administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of
evidence, a court in reviewing a decision of such an agency must
look for convincing evidence of a substantial and credible nature.
DECISIONS OF FEDERAL COURTS AND COURTS OF THE SEVERAL STATES
The value of citing decisions of the federal courts and courts
of the several states is not peculiarly affected by the fact that
they are based on a review of an administrative hearing. In other
words, this source of authority is usable in the same manner as
it is in the review of a judicial trial. The only point of interest
is that this source is extremely large and diversified in compari-
son to that of Colorado cases alone. Of course, care must be taken
to distinguish the cases which are based on statutory provisions,
or, in se . of federal decisions, on. Federal AdministrativeProcedure Act.
THE UNITED STATES AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS
As a source of authority the constitutions are limited to the
requirement of due process of law. Due process requires, among
other things, that there be an opportunity to be heard and a
finding in accord with the evidence. Therefore, if the creating
statute failed to provide for a hearing, or if a party were deprived
of the right to a hearing and to present evidence on his own behalf,
a defense could be interposed that the statute or agency action
was unconstitutional in that it deprived the party of his property
without due process of law.
Moreover, the requirement that there be a finding in accord
with the evidence presupposes that there is some "substantial evi-
dence" upon which the finding is predicated. Thus, under the
aforementioned views of the Colorado Supreme Court, a decision
based solely on hearsay and not buttressed by any legal evidence
would seemingly fall within this interdiction and therefore not
be a finding in accord with the evidence as required by the due
process clauses of the respective constitutions.
CONCLUSION
From the above discussion, it is submitted that the method
of discovering the applicable law pertaining to the use of evi-
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dence before administrative agencies in Colorado is not clear-cut
or simple. Therefore, in view of the increasing number and com-
plexity of administrative agencies in this state, it is submitted
that the adoption by the Legislature of an administrative code of
procedure would create desirable and much needed uniformity and
simplicity. Such a code has been adopted in some of the other
states and by the federal government.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act was approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws at its 1946 Session. It represents an effort of the legal pro-
fession "to standardize by statute the practices and principles of
administrative agencies which adjudicate or make rules." IS Per-
taining to evidence, sec. 9 provides:
In contested cases:
(1) Agencies may admit and give probative effect to
evidence which possesses probative value commonly ac-
cepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs. They shall give effect to the rules of privilege
recognized by law. They may exclude incompetent, ir-
relevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence.
(2) All evidence, including records and documents
in the possession of the agency of which it desires to
avail itself, shall be offered and made a part of the record
in the case, and no other factual information or evidence
shall be considered in the determination of the case. Docu-
mentary evidence may be received in the form of copies
or excerpts, or by incorporation by reference.
(3) Every party shall have the right of cross-exami-
nation of witnesses who testify, and shall have the right
to submit rebuttal evidence.
(4) Agencies may take notice of judicially cogniza-
ble facts and in addition may take notice of general, tech-
nical, or scientific facts within their specialized knowl-
edge. Parties shall be notified either before or during
hearing, or by reference in preliminary reports or other-
wise, of the material so noticed, and they shall be afforded
an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. Agencies
may utilize their experience, technical competence, and
specialized knowledge in the evaluation of the evidence
presented to them.
COLORADO REPORTS NEEDED
Two new District Court divisions were authorized for Denver
by the 1952 General Assembly and will be in service within the
month. Complete sets of the Colorado Reports and Colorado Ap-
peals are urgently needed for these courts. Anyone knowing where
such sets may be available should contact J. B. Goodman, Jr.,
clerk of the Denver District Court, at once. The search for these
volumes deserves a special effort on the part of the bar.
18 GFLLIHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1119 (1947).
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